In this paper, we consider coordinated movement of a network of vehicles consisting a bounded number of malicious agents, that is, vehicles must reach consensus in longitudinal position and a common predefined velocity. The motions of vehicles are modeled by double-integrator dynamics and communications over the network are asynchronous with delays. Each normal vehicle updates its states by utilizing the information it receives from vehicles in its vicinity. On the other hand, misbehaving vehicles make updates arbitrarily and might threaten the consensus within the network by intentionally changing their moving direction or broadcasting faulty information in their neighborhood. We propose an asynchronous updating strategy for normal vehicles, based on filtering extreme values received from neighboring vehicles, to save them from being misguided by malicious vehicles. We show that there exist topological constraints on the network in terms of graph robustness under which the vehicles resiliently achieve coordinated movement. Numerical simulations are provided to evaluate the results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern intelligent vehicles are not only used for driving but are processors that can perform complicated tasks and connect to their surroundings [1] . The advent of ever-growing Internet of Vehicles supported by a low latency communication platform, along with cloud services, enables vehicles to transmit and receive necessary information which can potentially be used for traffic management and fuel efficiency, as well as increasing the reliability of individual vehicle's estimation and control [2] , [3] . However, as the vehicles become more connected, they become more prone to adversarial actions and cyber-attacks. To this end, devising defense mechanisms, or using off-the-shelf methods in cyber-security, to increase the security for both intra-vehicle networking and inter-vehicular communications, is of great importance [4] - [7] . An efficient defense mechanism must be able to prevent the attack as much as possible, detect the attack in case of happening, and satisfy a level of resilience in performing tasks despite the existence of an attack [8] . The focus of the current paper is the application of resilience methods to a Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) strategy.
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications can provide direct data transfer with a much lower delay compared to radars [9] and enable vehicles to drive closely with short intervehicular distances, while collision avoidance algorithms assist this strategy [10] , [11] . This will increase the amount of road throughput and reduce the need for developing more road networks. Cooperative adaptive cruise control, as one of the applications of V2V communications, is among the widely used methods in controlling highway traffic systems [12] . In this approach, vehicles tend to follow specific speeds while maintaining a safe distance from each other and at the same time consume as little space as possible in the highway to facilitate the traffic flow [13] . Since wireless communication plays pivotal roles in CACC, we must make it resilient to malicious actions [14] . Attack resilience algorithms in CACC context refer to a class of actions taken to bypass the attacker or mitigate its effect in the presence of an attack, in order to improve performance in vehicle formation and velocity tracking. While the attack mitigation can be addressed via robust control techniques, in this paper, we investigate methods to bypass the attacker in CACC in a distributed manner.
In multi-agent systems, various consensus problems have been studied extensively in the past decade [15] , [16] where locally connected agents interact to achieve the global goal of reaching a common state. In this literature, resilient consensus points to the case where some of the agents in the network try to deceive the others or are possibly crashed. Such malicious agents might even prevent the normal vehicles from reaching agreement by evading to execute the local state updating rule. This type of consensus problems has a rich history in distributed algorithms in the area of computer science (see, e.g., [17] ).
There are different techniques to relieve or counteract the effects of attacks in multi-agent systems. In some solutions, each agent identifies the adversaries within the network by observing their past information -sort of fault detection and isolation strategy [18] - [20] . However, usually in these techniques, each agent needs global knowledge of the network such as topology, which is not typically desirable in distributed algorithms. It is shown that to overrule the effects of f malicious vehicles, the network has to be at least (2f + 1)connected [18] , [20] .
In another class of distributed resilient consensus algorithms, each agent utilizes a kind of filtering of the information received from suspicious agents or those with out of range values in its neighborhood at each time step. This class of algorithms are often called Mean Subsequence Reduced (MSR) algorithms, which was coined in [21] and have been used extensively in the literature of computer science [17] , [22] - [26] as well as control [27] - [30] . In literature, convergence of these algorithms is guaranteed by some constraints on the topology. While the traditional connectivity measure is not adequate for MSR-type algorithms, as is stated in [30] , graph robustness is a connectivity measure which has been frequently used in different consensus problems to ensure that a network achieves agreement [31] , [32] .
In this paper, we use resilient consensus notions introduced in computer science literature [31] to solve a real world problem in multi-vehicle coordinated movement. We consider longitudinal cooperative cruise control in the presence of some malicious vehicles in the network. Vehicles are supposed to have second-order dynamics, which is a common model for autonomous mobile vehicles. Also, each vehicle makes updates based on the current or past positions and velocities of itself and its neighbors and applies the control through its acceleration. We developed our distributed algorithms in an asynchronous setting, where each normal vehicle may decide to update only occasionally with possibly delayed data received from its neighbors. This is clearly a more vulnerable situation, allowing the adversaries to take advantage by quickly moving back and forth or sending false data to the reachable vehicles. We suppose that the worst-case scenario may happen, where the malicious vehicles are aware of the topology, updating times, the transmitted data packets by normal vehicles, and even delays of communications. On the other hand, the normal vehicles only have access to the data packets received directly from their neighbors; thus they cannot predict adversaries' behavior. We finally analyze the topology constraint needed for the resilient cooperative cruise control problem.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we introduce the preliminaries and problem setup. Our main results including the update rule, the filtering algorithm, and the required topology constraints are presented in Section III. We illustrate the effectiveness of our strategy through a numerical example in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Graph Theory Notions
According to [15] , we recall some preliminary concepts on graphs. A digraph with n nodes (n > 1) is defined as G = (V, E) with the set of nodes V = {1, . . . , n} and the set of edges E ⊆ V × V. An incoming link from node j to node i is denoted by (j, i) ∈ E. A graph is called complete if ∀i, j ∈ V, i = j : (i, j) ∈ E. For node i, the set of its neighbors is denoted by N i = {j|(j, i) ∈ E} and the number of its neighbors, i.e. its degree, is denoted by
If there is a path between each pair of nodes in the directed graph G, it is said to be strongly connected. The vertex connectivity K(G) of the graph G is the minimum number of nodes such that by removing them and all associated edges, the graph is not strongly connected anymore. Then, the graph is said to be κconnected if K(G) ≥ κ. A directed graph is said to have a directed spanning tree if there exist a node in the graph from which there is a path to every other node. Note that we will use the terms node and vehicle interchangeably in this paper.
For the MSR-type algorithms to achieve resilient consensus, the critical topological notion is graph robustness, which is a connectivity measure of graphs. Robust graphs were first introduced in [30] for the analysis of resilient consensus of first-order multi-vehicle systems. Definition 1. ((r, s)-robust) The digraph G = (V, E) is (r, s)robust (r, s < n) if for every pair of nonempty disjoint subsets T 1 , T 2 ⊂ V, at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
S is the set of all nodes in S which have at least r incoming edges from outside of S . In particular, graphs which are (r, 1)-robust are called r-robust.
B. Physics of the System
Consider a network of vehicles driving in a road whose communications are through the directed graph G. Each vehicle i ∈ V has a second-order dynamic system given bẏ
where x i (t) ∈ R and v i (t) ∈ R are the position and the velocity of the ith vehicle, respectively, and u i (t) is its control input at time t ≥ 0. The discrete form of the dynamic system (1) with sampling period T is represented as
where
, and u i [k] are, respectively, the position, the velocity, and the control input of the ith vehicle at t = kT for k ∈ Z + [16] .
C. Problem Setup
In this paper, we investigate the coordinated movement of networked vehicles in the sense that they reach a same fixed velocity asymptotically leading to a formation with a predefined (safe) inter-vehicular distance:
where δ ij is the position of nodes i relative to j and r is the desired velocity of the networked vehicles which is assumed to be known for all.
Particularly, we study the case where some vehicles malfunction due to failure, disturbances, or various cyber attacks. Note that we do not consider different types of cyber attacks or failures in this paper. We focus on the consequences of such attacks or failures in consensus of the vehicle network. We suppose some vehicles, here referred to malicious, lose their control or intentionally send false data to their neighbors in the network. In order to formulate the problem, we introduce notions related to malicious vehicles and consensus in the presence of such vehicles.
There are two possible situations in which malicious vehicles might deceive the normal vehicles and prevent them from reaching consensus. i) Vehicles use an active sensing system: they can estimate the state of their neighbors on their own (for example using their 3D camera or LiDAR system). ii) Vehicles use a passive sensing system: they trust the information they receive from their neighbors (for example using their GPS receiver or wireless communication system which are susceptible to cyber attacks).
In the first case, malicious vehicles can intentionally change their moving direction or oscillate by avoiding any prescribed update rule and choosing arbitrary control inputs. Accordingly, all normal vehicles are supposed to follow. In the second case, malicious vehicles can arbitrarily broadcast any information in their neighborhood to deceive their neighbors. Note that the dynamics for all vehicles still remain the same as (2) .
Accordingly, we divide the vehicles into two groups of malicious and normal vehicles as follows.
Definition 2. (Malicious and Normal Vehicles)
Vehicle i is called malicious if it can evade to follow any prescribed algorithm for updating its control input or to broadcast false state feedback to its neighbors. Otherwise, it is called normal. The index set of malicious vehicles is denoted by M ⊂ V. The numbers of normal vehicles and malicious vehicles are denoted by n N and n M , respectively. Furthermore, we assume that an upper bound is available for the number of misbehaving vehicles in the entire network or at least in each normal vehicle's neighborhood.
The network is flocal malicious if the number of malicious vehicles in the neighborhood of each normal vehicle i is bounded by f , i.e.,
Now, we formally introduce the notion of resilient coordinated movement for the network of second-order vehicles as follows.
Definition 5. (Resilient Coordinated Movement) For any possible set of malicious vehicles and any malicious inputs, the network of vehicles is said to achieve resilient coordinated movement if it holds that
where δ ij is a predefined (safe) intervehicular distance between the nodes i and j and r is the desired velocity of the networked vehicles.
In practice, the vehicles might not be synchronized nor have access to the current data of all neighbors simultaneously. Thus, the solution must be robust against both communication delays and asynchrony which are very important in real world applications. Therefore, the main problem which we consider in this paper is as follows:
Under the f -total malicious model, find a condition on the network topology so that the normal vehicles reach the resilient coordinated movement using an asynchronous update rule.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present the update rule and MSR-type algorithm by which the normal vehicles are able to reach the coordinated movement in the presence of misbehaving vehicles. We present the updating strategy compatible with communication delays and asynchrony; so that the vehicles are allowed to update at different times with delayed information. Note that the updating strategies that are developed here must be enhanced with the constraints on the topology of the network which will be discussed in the next section.
A. Update Rule
We modified the algorithm and update rule proposed in [28] called DP-MSR (double-integrator Position-based Mean Subsequence Reduced) to suit the problem of resilient coordinated movement. Each normal vehicle distributively uses the relative position to its neighbors and its own velocity as the feedback.
To develop the update rule for coordinated movement, first we use a change of variables as follows:
Substituting the new variables into the dynamic system (2), we have:
Based on the update rule proposed in [28] , the network of vehicles with the dynamic system (4), which is equivalent to (1), can achieve consensus in the sense that
→ 0 as k → ∞, ∀i, j ∈ V by using the following update rule: relative to its own current position. The delays are time varying and may be different at each edge, but we assume the common upper bound τ as
If all the vehicles in the network perform the update rule (5), we have:
Note that each normal vehicle becomes aware of the position of each of its neighbors at least once in τ time steps, but possibly at different time instants. In (5) , it is also assumed that vehicle i uses its own velocity without delay. The value of τ in (6) can be arbitrary and need not be necessarily known to the vehicles since this information is not used in the update rule.
We also emphasize that, in fully asynchronous settings, vehicles must also be facilitated with their own clocks [33] . However, we consider the so-called partially asynchronous updating setting in this paper. This is a common term in the literature for those update protocols with both delay and 
The normal vehicle i ignores the incoming edges from those vehicles. else
The normal vehicle i ignores the incoming edges from f vehicles counting from those having the largest relative position values. end if there are less than f vehicles that
The normal vehicle i ignores the incoming edges from f vehicles counting from those having the smallest relative position values. end Vehicle i applies the control input (5) different update times [34] and in fact contains some level of synchrony regarding the same sampling times. Considering delays in communicated data packets to address partial asynchrony has been studied in [33] , [35] , [36] .
The malicious vehicles are assumed to be omniscient. Here, it means that they have full knowledge of the topology, updating times, the transmitted data packets by normal vehicles, and even delays τ ij [k] for all communication links and k ≥ 0. The malicious vehicles might take advantage of this knowledge to make deceiving back and forth movements or broadcast faulty data packets to confuse and prevent the normal vehicles to reach consensus.
The asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm which is executed by each vehicle at each time step k is outlines in Algorithm 1.
B. Resilient Consensus Analysis
We present the main result of the paper in this section, addressing resilient coordinated movement of the networked vehicles via the asynchronous DP-MSR, executing by each vehicle, in the presence of delayed information. Theorem 1. Under the f -total malicious model, the network of vehicles with second-order dynamics using the control in (5) and the Asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm reaches resilient coordinated movement with an exponential convergence rate, if the underlying graph is (2f + 1)-robust, and if it reaches resilient coordinated movement, the underlying graph is at least (f + 1, f + 1)-robust.
Proof. (Sufficiency) The proof is similar to what is presented in [31] . The proof there is presented for the position consensus of the original dynamic system (1) . Here, the dynamic system is replaced with (4) and the result is valid for p[k] and q[k], i.e.
Thus, the relative positions of the vehicles are functions of their communication delays which is bounded byτ . In fact all the vehicles asymptotically reach a same velocity and meet a formation with the inter-vehicular distance of δ ij which can fluctuate inside a bounded interval:
(Necessity) We consider the synchronous networks without communication delays as the proof of necessity is also valid for the more general case of partially asynchronous networks with communication delays. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that the network is not (f + 1, f + 1)-robust. Then, there are nonempty disjoint sets V 1 , V 2 ⊂ V such that none of the conditions 1-3 in Definition 1 holds. Suppose that
. We also suppose that q i [0] = 0, ∀i ∈ V. From condition 3, we have that
V2
are malicious and keep their values constant. There is at least one normal vehicle in V 1 and one normal vehicle in V 2 by |X f +1 V1 | < |V 1 | and |X f +1 V2 | < |V 2 | because conditions 1 and 2 do not hold. These normal vehicles have f or fewer neighbors outside of their own sets because they are not in
As a result, all normal vehicles in V 1 and V 2 update based only on the values inside V 1 and V 2 by removing the values received from outside of their sets. This makes their values unchanged at a and b. Hence, there will be no agreement among the normal vehicles.
In the above results, we observe that there is a gap between the sufficiency and the necessity conditions in Theorem 1. However, this gap may be essential to the problem. This point is illustrated by a 2f -robust graph in Fig. 1, which is not resilient to f totally bounded adversarial vehicles as we will formally discuss in what follows.
This graph is composed of four subgraphs G i , i = 1, . . . , 4, and each of them is a complete graph. The graph G 1 consists of 4f vehicles and the rest have f vehicles. Each vehicle in G 2 has incoming links from 2f vehicles of G 1 . Every vehicle in G 3 has f links from G 1 and f links from G 2 . Likewise, each vehicle of G 4 has a link from every vehicle in G 1 and f incoming links from G 2 .
Note that the minimum degree for a 2f -robust graph is 2f . However for this graph, the minimum degree of the vehicles is 2f + 1 or greater. This is an important point for the following Fig. 1 . A 2f -robust network in which vehicles fail to reach coordinated movement with partial asynchrony and delayed information (each vehicle in this figure is representative for a set of f vehicles that are strongly connected).
reason. If a normal vehicle has only 2f neighbors, it might ignore all of them under the asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm, which in turn means that the vehicle will keep its current state. It is clear that if this happens for more than two vehicles in the network, coordinated movement cannot take place. The next proposition is based on this graph. Proposition 1. There exists a 2f -robust network with the minimum degree 2f + 1 under which normal vehicles may not achieve resilient consensus by the asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm.
Proof. We claim that the graph in Fig. 1 is 2f -robust and (f + 1, f + 1)-robust at the same time, but resilient consensus cannot be reached under the asynchronous DP-MSR. Suppose that all vehicles in G 2 are malicious. We show a scenario in which by the DP-MSR algorithm, the values of the vehicles in G 3 and G 4 never agree.
Note that G 1 is 2f -robust because of Lemma 1 (v) (see Appendix). By (iv) of this lemma, the graph obtained by adding G 2 is still 2f -robust, since there are 2f edges from G 1 . Similarly, adding G 3 and G 4 and the required edges based on (iv) of Lemma 1 also keeps the graph to be 2f -robust.
We assume vehicles have the following initial states for k 0 = 0 and the prior τ steps:
The time delays are chosen by the following scenario: τ ij [2m] = 0 and τ ij [2m + 1] = 1 for (j, i) ∈ E, j ∈ V 2 , i ∈ V 3 , and m ∈ Z + . Also, τ j [2m] = 1 and τ j [2m + 1] = 0 for (j, ) ∈ E, j ∈ V 2 , ∈ V 4 , and m ∈ Z + . All other links have no delay. Then, to the vehicles in G 3 , the malicious vehicles appear to be stationary at the state value a − δ i 2 and to the vehicles in G 4 at the state value b + δ i 2 . By executing the asynchronous DP-MSR at k = 0, the vehicles in G 3 will ignore every neighbor in G 1 since a− δ i 2 < c. Thus, for i ∈ V 3 , p i [1] = a − δ i 2 . At k = 1, the same happens for the vehicles ∈ V 4 and they stay at b + δ i 2 . Since the vehicles in G 3 are not affected by any vehicles with state values larger than a − δ i 2 , they remain at their state value for all future steps. The same holds among the normal vehicles in the network, and therefore p i [k] = a − 
C. Further Results and Discussions
Here, we provide some discussions related to the results of the paper and their potential extensions.
First, it is noteworthy that the result of Theorem 1 holds for the f -local malicious model as well, which is now stated as a corollary. This follows since in the proof of the theorem, only the number of malicious vehicles in each normal vehicle's neighborhood plays a role. Corollary 1. Under the f -local malicious model, the network of vehicles with second-order dynamics using the control in (5) and the asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm reaches resilient coordinated movement, if the underlying graph is (2f + 1)robust.
Note that the results in this paper are all valid for the second-order networks whose underlying graphs are fixed, i.e. with time-invariant E. In [29] , for the first-order synchronous vehicle networks, there is a natural extension for the timevarying G[k] and based on that G[k] = (V, E[k]) is enough to be (f + 1, f + 1)-robust at each time k. The same condition is valid here, again for second-order synchronous networks. However, the assumption on robustness of the graph at each time k is quite conservative and might bring difficulties in practice. Here, we would like to state a new relaxed condition for the partially asynchronous time-varying networks. The following definition has a key role for this purpose: In a time-varying network, each normal vehicle i can use the outdated links from τ time steps back whenever some information are not available. Thus, the sufficient condition is obtained with the following additional assumptions:
By the above discussions, the sufficient condition is presented as below.
Corollary 2. Under the f -total/f -local malicious model, the time-varying network of vehicles with second-order dynamics using control input (5) and asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm reaches resilient coordinated movement, if the underlying graph is jointly (2f + 1)-robust under condition (7) . Now, we discuss the relation between the graph properties proposed here for the resilient coordinated movement problem and those in standard consensus problems without any adversaries [33] , [37] - [39] . In this paper, we assumed that the number of adversarial vehicles is upper bounded by f . By removing all edges connected to malicious vehicles, we can obtain a subgraph of G consisting of only the normal vehicles. 
By (vi) of Lemma 1 (see Appendix), this network becomes
(1, f + 1)-robust. Now, the obtained graph has a spanning tree by (iv) of the same lemma. It is well known that under such a graph, consensus can be achieved. It is also interesting that the sufficient condition in Corollary 2 is consistent with the consensus condition on time-varying networks known as having jointly spanning tree [40] .
It is further noted that in [21] , [22] , [25] , [26] , [29] , [41] , malicious nodes are allowed to deny making any transmissions, which is often called omissive faults. Hence, the normal vehicle i would wait to receive at least d i − f values from its neighbors before making an update. It should be noted that omissive faults can also be tolerated by the MSRtype algorithms. The malicious vehicles knowing that the normal vehicles apply the asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm might attempt to make this kind of attack to cause denial of information for filtering the received values in Algorithm 1. In such cases, if vehicle i does not receive the data packets from m i [k] incoming neighbors at time k, then the parameter of the asynchronous DP-MSR for that vehicle can be changed from 2f to 2(f − m i [k]) assuming that vehicle i is aware of d i [k]. The topology analysis remains mostly the same.
Besides, the DP-MSR algorithms for f -total malicious models are resilient against another type of adversaries studied in [42] . There, the attackers can create extra links in the networks, but adding links does not change the value of f of the networks. For example, in our problem, this can happen in a highway when some additional vehicles are passing by the connected vehicles network. However, note that the situation is subtly different in the case with the f -local model. Adding an extra link might increase the number of malicious vehicles in a neighborhood of some normal vehicles. Accordingly, the vehicles must be aware of the created links so as to remove them along with the edges ignored in the asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We consider a network of vehicles connected together on the network illustrated in Fig. 2 with partially asynchronous delayed setting. This graph is (2, 2)-robust (refer to Section VI for more discussion). In this network, one of the vehicles is set to be malicious. The bound on the number of malicious vehicles is fixed at f = 1. The sampling period is set to be T = 0.3, and the parameter α = 0.9 in (5). Note that we consider only longitudinal motion of vehicles and in this example we assume that they are moving in parallel. Thus x i ∈ V \ M may cross over each other in the figures, while the vehicles cannot collide.
Here, four normal vehicles periodically make updates within each 12 time steps with various timings. Specifically, vehicles 1, 2, 3, and 5 make updates at time steps k = 12 + 6, 12 + 9, 12 +11, 12 +4 for ∈ Z + , respectively. We assume that at these time steps, there is no delay for their updates. However, each vehicle deals with nonuniform time-varying delays (τ = 11) since the normal vehicles do not receive new information at other time steps. The initial states of the vehicles are given by oscillate to be appeared as: x 4 [2k] = 2+kT r and x 4 [2k+1] = 9 for all k ≥ 0. In Figs. 3 and 4 , the time responses of the positions and velocities of normal vehicles are presented -the oscillatory trajectory of vehicle 4 is not shown. As expected, although the underlying network is (2, 2)-robust, as a necessary condition, the normal vehicles do not come to consensus among their positions. This is an interesting situation since the asynchronous DP-MSR cannot prevent the normal vehicles from being deceived by the malicious vehicle. Fig. 3 indicates that in fact vehicles are divided into two groups and move with a relative distance because of the malicious behavior of vehicle 4, oscillating to be appeared in various relative positions.
In the next simulation example, we modified the graph structure by adding enough edges to obtain a 3-robust graph (which is 2f +1-robust in this case). To this end, we conducted the same simulation on the complete graph with 5 nodes, which is the only 3-robust graph with 5 nodes. The time responses in Fig. 5 verify the sufficient condition of Theorem 1 for the partially asynchronous setting. The oscillations of the normal vehicles in asynchronous updating is visible from the responses in their velocities shown in Figs. 4 and 6.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of resilient coordinated movement of a network of connected vehicles with secondorder longitudinal dynamics, where the maximum number of malicious vehicles in the network is determined and known to the vehicles. We have proposed an MSR-type algorithm for the normal vehicles to reach consensus on their relative positions and a predefined target velocity. A necessary and sufficient condition in terms of robust topology of coordinated vehicles to reach consensus has been developed. Communications in the network are considered to be partially asynchronous and with bounded delays. In future research, we would like to consider 2D coordinated movement of connected vehicles and develop appropriate updating algorithms.
VI. APPENDIX
The following lemma helps to have a better understanding of (r, s)-robust graphs [43] introduced in Definition 1.
Lemma 1.
For an (r, s)-robust graph G, the followings hold:
(i) G is (r , s )-robust, where 0 ≤ r ≤ r and 1 ≤ s ≤ s, and in particular, it is r-robust. (ii) G is (r − 1, s + 1)-robust. (iii) G is at least r-connected, but an r-connected graph is not necessarily r-robust. (iv) G has a directed spanning tree.
(v) r ≤ n/2 . Also, if G is a complete graph, then it is (r , s)-robust for all 0 < r ≤ n/2 and 1 ≤ s ≤ n. (vi) The graph G = (V, E 0 ) is (r − p, s)-robust, when G is formed by removing at most p edges from neighbors of each node in V, where p < r. (vii) The graph G = (V ∪ {v 0 }, E ∪ E 0 ), where v 0 is a node added to G and E 0 is the edge set related to v 0 , is rrobust if d v0 ≥ r + s − 1. Moreover, a graph is (r, s)-robust if it is (r + s − 1)-robust.
It is clear that (r, s)-robustness is more restrictive than rrobustness. The graph with five nodes in Fig. 2 can be shown to be (2, 2)-robust, but not 3-robust. In general, to determine if a given graph has a robustness property is computationally difficult since the problem involves combinatorial aspects. However, it is known that random graphs possess robustness when their size tends to infinity [44] .
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